Public Opinion and Europe : Between High Expectations and Incapacity Syndrome

Democracy is based on the combination of a principle of power - which is expected to enable effective action - and a principle of legitimacy, which forms the foundation of that power: the Demos and the Kratos. The legitimacy of a political regime, at both the national and supranational levels, is linked to the "trust" placed in it by the "community of citizens." The question of public support - the true "invisible genius of the city" (to borrow Guglielmo Ferrero’s elegant phrase) - is essential.

In the case of the European Union, the issue of trust, and the indicators used to measure citizens’ attitudes toward European integration, has been the subject of extensive research, which places the concept of "support" at the center of the analysis. In particular, the work of David Easton is very useful here, notably his distinction between "diffuse support" and "specific support." The distinction between "diffuse" and "specific" support allows us to avoid placing on the same analytical plane, on the one hand, commitment to the principles of European integration ("diffuse" support) and, on the other, evaluations or demands regarding public policies (what is known as "specific" support).

We will use this distinction here to examine the dynamics of public support within member states toward the European Union, with a particular focus on public opinion in France.

Naturally, public opinion is not monolithic. Powerful sociological factors play a major role in the French people’s attitude towards Europe. The data show that the social divide and the "sociological bias" typically reflected in opinions about Europe remain deeply entrenched. The education effect - more powerful than the effects of age or generation - acts as a catalyst for the impact of social status on opinions. Furthermore, public opinion cannot be viewed from a static perspective as it has undergone significant changes in France: from a "permissive consensus" (that is, a relatively passive acceptance by citizens and a wide margin of maneuver left to political elites) during the early decades of European integration, the "European question" has gradually entered the realm of democratic debate, giving rise in France to the emergence of a specific form of Euroscepticism.

"Diffuse support" for the Union remains in the majority, despite public opinion in France that remains uniquely skeptical

Belonging to the Union continues to be widely perceived as a good thing

Across the EU, attitudes toward European integration remain generally positive. According to Standard Eurobarometer Spring 2026 (our reference thereafter, unless otherwise noted), 58% of Europeans consider their country’s membership in the EU to be a good thing, and 72% believe their country has benefited from it. A relative majority also has a favorable opinion of the EU, although opinions are more divided on this point: 45% have a positive view, 35% a neutral view, and 19% a negative view.

As usual, France is consistently more critical than the European average on these indicators: 44% of respondents in France view EU membership as a good thing, 14 percentage points below the European average; 58% believe that France has benefited from its EU membership, compared to 72% across Europe. The European Parliament’s survey from last spring reports a similar finding. In fact, France recorded the second-lowest result among the 27 member states on this issue. This more critical view is reflected in the image of the EU: only 35% of respondents in France have a positive image of the EU, compared to 45% across the EU as a whole.

Trust has grown at the European level, but remains more fragile in France

A little over half of Europeans say they trust the EU, while 60% say they are optimistic about its future. These results are part of a longer-term trend: European citizens’ trust in the Union has grown over the past decade. In 2016, 55% of Europeans said they did not trust the EU. Ten years later, the balance of trust appears to have shifted, reflecting a gradually more positive shift in how the Union is viewed.

One could hypothesise that the increasing brutalisation of the world around us has helped crystallise the distinction between "inside" and "outside," thereby strengthening internal cohesion within the EU. The dynamics resulting from the responses to "sovereignty shocks" over the past decade (Brexit, the health crisis, the war in Ukraine, energy crises, the war in the Middle East, etc.) illustrates this: the fact that Europeans must provide common, united responses to external challenges tends to strengthen their cohesion. And Eurobarometer opinion polls suggest that public opinion has indeed become more favorable toward participation in the EU, seeing it as a relevant level of government response, capable of presenting a united front against external threats.

Once again, France lags behind this trend. Trust in the EU stands at 38%, 13 points below the European average of 51%, placing France in second-to-last place among member states. One similarity is worth noting, however: like Europeans as a whole, the French have more confidence in the EU than they did 10 years ago (30% in 2016). The gap is also evident in outlooks for the future: only 45% of respondents in France say they are optimistic about the future of the EU, compared with 60% across the Union. This gap has widened over the past decade: while optimism has risen by 10 points across Europe since 2016, it has remained virtually stable in France (+1 point). France thus appears to be lagging behind a long-term European trend.

Nevertheless, 64% of French people believe that France is better equipped to face the future within the EU than outside it - just two points below the European average.

Public opinion in France thus appears distinct from that of other countries regarding the EU: while there is a sense of attachment to and recognition of the EU’s benefits, levels of trust and optimism are lower. In other words, while there is no outright europhobia ("hard Euroskepticism") in France, there is a much stronger sense of mistrust than in many other member states.

Is There Something Unique About French Public Opinion Toward the EU?

How can we explain this distinctive feature of French public opinion toward "Europe"? Beyond short-term factors, fundamentally and structurally, the attitudes of the French toward Europe are shaped by a national logic of "projection" vis-à-vis Europe. This logic helps explain the ambivalence at the heart of the relationship between the French and the EU: the EU is either perceived as an "instrument" serving France’s interests, or it acts as a revealing mirror - or a distorting one - of the famous "French exception." From this perspective, several "cultural" factors can be cited to construe the specific relationship the French have with the EU: on the one hand, a unitary political culture that is at odds with the European culture of compromise; on the other hand, a socioeconomic culture marked by a certain distrust, or even hostility, toward liberalism. This fuels often negative perceptions of free trade and competition and, more broadly, a critical attitude toward the market - which lies at the heart of European integration - as illustrated in France by the recurring debates on industrial policy and competition policy.

This national perspective finally puts France’s reluctance toward enlargement into context. While 53% of Europeans support future enlargement (compared to 40% who oppose it), the differences among member states are nevertheless considerable. Support stands at 71% in Spain and Malta, 70% in Lithuania, and 67% in Croatia, while France sits at the opposite end of the spectrum: 54% of French people are opposed to enlargement, and only 35% support it. The gap with the European average is particularly pronounced: support in France is 18 points below the European average. Here again, the ambivalence at the heart of France’s approach to Europe is a key explanatory factor. Since the early days of European integration, France has managed to combine two radically different visions of the rationale behind its European commitment: on the one hand, the project of the "founding fathers" (convergence of member states’ interests) and, on the other, the Gaullist vision of Europe as a tool enabling France to promote its national interests. With past enlargements, the French have discovered that "Europe is not just a larger version of France"! This is undoubtedly the main reason for the nostalgic discourse - in France in particular - about "little Europe", and for the difficulty in coming to terms with the change in scale brought about by the enlarged Union. This challenge has been exacerbated by the geopolitisationof Europe since the war in Ukraine and the return of the issue of enlargement to the forefront of the European agenda.

Furthermore, this distrust of the European Union is part of a broader French context of mistrust toward institutions. Whether it concerns political parties, the media, or political institutions (both national and international, such as the United Nations or NATO, where France consistently ranks below the European average), the French generally express lower levels of trust than their European neighbors. This distrust is accompanied by particularly pronounced pessimism regarding the country’s future. The French people’s critical view of the EU is therefore not an exception, but part of a broader crisis of confidence in institutions and their ability to take effective action.

Faced with a more uncertain environment, there is a growing demand for collective action at the European level

Regarding "specific support," the European Parliament’s survey from last spring suggests that support for the EU is increasingly based on a demand for collective protection. 75% of Europeans view the EU as a beacon of stability in a troubled world. Nine out of ten believe that member states should work more closely together to address future global challenges, while 73% believe the EU needs more resources to respond to them. The Standard Eurobarometer confirms this expectation: 61% believe that more decisions should be made at the European level.

This demand for protection is linked to a generally pessimistic outlook on the international environment. A majority of Europeans (58%) take a pessimistic view of the world’s future-a trend that has been on the rise since last year.

On this point, the data confirm French ambivalence toward the EU. Forty-three percent of respondents in France say they are optimistic about their country’s future, compared to a European average of 58 percent, while 24 percent say they are optimistic about the world’s future, compared to 38 percent across the EU.

Unsurprisingly, the French are therefore significantly more pessimistic than other Europeans. On the other hand, three-quarters of respondents in France view the EU as a source of stability in a troubled world-exactly the European average; 91% want member states to be more united in the face of global challenges, slightly more than the European average of 90%, while 71% believe the EU needs more resources to address them. This is precisely where the French ambivalence lies: while the French are significantly more critical of the EU than the average, they differ much less from the average when it comes to their expectations of the European level.

A Call for Socioeconomic Protection

At the national level, concerns are primarily focused on economic issues. Rising prices, inflation, and the cost of living are the issues most frequently cited by Europeans (36%, up 5 percentage points since fall 2025) and are now the top national concern in 20 Member States, up from 18 in fall 2025. The same is true in France, where 40% of respondents rank this concern as their top priority.

This emphasis on economic issues is also reflected in expectations regarding the European Union. At the European level, 35% of respondents want the EU to do more to reduce dependencies in the areas of energy, resources, and infrastructure, and 32% in the areas of competitiveness, the economy, and industry.

Furthermore, the priorities set for the European budget reveal a strong social dimension (even though the term has different meanings in the Member States). Europeans rank social affairs, employment, and public health as their top priority (41%), ahead of education, training, youth, culture, and the media (33%). This focus on social issues is part of a long-term trend: as early as spring 2015 (Standard Eurobarometer 83), employment and social affairs (43%) and public health (41%) were the top budget priorities for citizens across all Member States. Although these two areas are now grouped into a single category in the Eurobarometer - preventing a direct comparison of the results - their importance remains, more than ten years later, despite the rise in security concerns since 2022. In France, this issue (employment, social affairs, and public health) is also among the top priorities, cited by 39% of respondents. Next come education, training, youth, culture, and the media, at 38%, ahead of agriculture and rural development (37%).

The call for protection directed at the Union is therefore primarily an economic and social one: it combines controlling the cost of living, reducing dependencies, and preserving the social model.

A Call for Security Protection at the European Level

Concerns related to the international context also play a central role. The data show that the conflict in the Middle East is the top issue facing the EU, ahead of the international situation (i.e., other issues related to the international situation) and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Energy supply, security, and defense are tied for fifth place, each cited by 15% of Europeans.

These concerns translate into heightened expectations of the EU regarding security. Defense and security top the list of areas where citizens want the EU to step up its efforts, cited by 39% of Europeans and 44% of French citizens (European Parliament Survey 2026).

Budget priorities confirm this expectation. At the European level, 38% of respondents want security and defense to be a priority in the EU budget, just behind social affairs, employment, and public health (41%). In France, the order is reversed: security and defense top the list at 42%, ahead of social affairs, employment, and public health (39%).

France thus stands out for its particularly strong demand for protection in the areas of security and defense, which complements the economic and social expectations placed on the EU.

The protection expected from the EU is therefore not limited to external security. It encompasses a threefold demand for geopolitical, economic, and social security, the priority of which varies among Member States. France stands out in particular for the greater emphasis it places on defense issues.

Lessening the gap between expectations and reality: a "credibility test" for the EU

Rising expectations coexist with a critical assessment of European action

The rise in expectations regarding the Union comes at a time when Europeans largely view its trajectory negatively. In 2026, 55% believe that things are heading in the wrong direction within the EU (+3 points since autumn 2025), compared with 32% who believe they are heading in the right direction (-2 percentage points).

This pessimism is part of a long-term trend (it was already the prevailing view 10 years ago, at 54%) and is not unique to the EU. At the national level, 60% of Europeans believe things are heading in the wrong direction in their country, compared with 31% who believe they are heading in the right direction. Europeans therefore remain more optimistic about the direction of the EU than about that of their own country.

This phenomenon is particularly pronounced in France: only 19% of respondents believe that things are moving in the right direction within the EU, compared with 32% at the European level: giving France the lowest proportion of optimists among the 27 member states.

These results, however, suggest that dissatisfaction should not automatically be equated with rejection of the Union: the negative assessment of its trajectory is part of a broader sense of pessimism that also extends to national situations and the international environment.

While the Union is criticized, it is still viewed as a relevant level of action in a more unstable and hostile world.

Attachment to the EU remains in the majority across Member States, including France, in terms of its usefulness as a relevant level of action: 61% in France compared to 62% across the EU as a whole. Support for Europe, meanwhile, stands at 67%, compared to 70% at the European level.

This partially resolves the apparent contradiction. Citizens may judge the Union’s trajectory or results harshly while still considering it the appropriate level of governance to address challenges they believe are increasingly unlikely to be tackled at the national level alone.

The French case is particularly revealing: while trust in the EU is 13 points below the European average and only 19% of French people believe the Union is heading in the right direction, 64% nevertheless believe that France will be better equipped to face the future as part of the EU, 75% view the EU as a source of stability, and 91% want greater unity among member states.

A divide between citizens’ expectations and the assessment of national and European public policy capacity

Regarding this aspect of "specific support," recent analyses have highlighted a divide - exacerbated by crises (the war in Ukraine, the climate emergency, energy crises, etc.) - between citizens’ expectations of EU institutions and their assessments of these institutions’ performance. The most telling responses emerging from all these demands, expectations, and assessments, as well as from all these forward-looking or retrospective judgments about their country or the EU, show that the divide between Europeans’ positive and negative opinions of the EU is strongly shaped by an optimistic or pessimistic outlook and by trust in national and European public action.

Among those with positive views of the EU, this is very clearly reflected in strong support for and confidence in the EU’s actions during and since the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as in approval of measures supporting Ukraine or sanctions against Russia. When these Europeans, those most supportive of European integration, are asked what the two most important problems their countries face today are, they cite economic challenges and geopolitical threats as the top concerns. They also express strong support for greater European integration in many areas, such as defense. In contrast, Europeans who are most opposed to the EU and European integration are pessimistic about the future of their country and the EU, but are characterized above all by their very strong opposition to the EU’s support of Ukraine and their dissatisfaction with the EU’s actions during major crises.

With regard to France specifically, it is among the group of countries whose residents are the least supportive of the EU, though there is no majority desire to leave the EU. Although the French attitude toward Europe is characterized by a high degree of pessimism and mistrust, this should not be interpreted as widespread and unqualified Euroskepticism among the French.

Overcoming the "Incapacity Syndrome"

The challenges facing our countries and the EU are considerable: war on the European continent; increasingly tense international relations, both economically and geopolitically; the accelerating pace of digital transformation; a new energy crisis driven by the situation in the Middle East; and so on. The threats are clear: Russia’s aggressive policies that threaten European security; China’s production surpluses that threaten European industry; and U.S. technological and financial dominance that is driving Europe’s most promising companies to leave the continent.

In this context, on the one hand, there is now broad consensus on the gravity of the economic and strategic situation, as well as on the critical juncture the EU and its member states are currently facing. This is evidenced by the alarming yet lucid reports issued in recent months by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi on the need to complete the single market and strengthen European competitiveness, as well as by the recent realization of the need to rearm Europe in light of the rift within the Western camp since Donald Trump’s return to the White House. On the other hand, however, increased political fragmentation within the EU and in most of its member states is widening the gap between the scale of the challenges to be addressed and the difficulty of implementing ambitious responses very quickly in a world that is highly unstable and conflict-ridden, and requires such collective action. This fragmentation makes it extremely difficult to present a united front and act as Europeans when external pressure is very strong. This fragmentation thus poses a threefold risk: political, economic, and strategic.

It is this key question - how to organize and effectively mobilize such a fragmented system - that must be addressed in order to accelerate the implementation of the European economic agenda and the development of collective defense at the European level. At stake is Europe’s ability not only to keep pace with other powers in the ongoing race, but also to meet the expectations expressed by the majority of the European public, even the most skeptical.

The French and Europeans therefore need a form of governance that embodies European unity and prepares the Union’s strategy in the unstable, uncertain, and increasingly hostile international context they face. They need to champion the "sovereignty" agenda and devise a plan for its organization and implementation. They must set themselves the goal of speaking with one voice and with sufficient strength to be heard and to carry weight. Finally, they must develop this strategy and implement it to maximize its effectiveness. To do so, they must organize themselves and prepare for action.

This is the essential prerequisite for overcoming the syndrome of incapacity and the resulting lack of credibility at both the national and European levels, and thereby restoring citizens’ confidence in their institutions’ ability to act in the world of today and tomorrow.

Copyright ROMEO BOETZLE / AFP
The Standard Eurobarometer is a survey conducted for the European Commission by Verian.