Ukraine and the Challenges of European Integration

Since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion on 24 February 2022, European integration has emerged as a central issue on the political agenda. The opening, in the summer of 2026, of the first two clusters of negotiation chapters marks the culmination of a process accelerated by Russia’s war of aggression, which has largely erased the divide that previously structured political life around the country’s geopolitical orientation. Whilst there is now broad consensus on membership of the European Union, both amongst the political elite and within the Ukrainian society, its implementation raises several economic and social issues.

Ukraine's candidacy: a long-standing political divide

Whilst integration into the European Union marked a significant turning point in the war, this issue is not a recent one. In 2013, President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision not to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union in favor of a Customs Union of the Eurasian Economic Union with Moscow triggered the first Maidan protests. After three months of protests that were harshly suppressed, Viktor Yanukovych fled the country before being removed from office by parliament. Following the organization of anticipated elections on 27 June 2014, the European Union signed an Association Agreement with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia as part of its European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), and this European orientation was enshrined in the Ukrainian Constitution in 2019. In this context, closer ties with the EU are accompanied by increased conditionality regarding institutional reforms. European macro-financial assistance is conditional upon the implementation of reforms designed to bring the Ukrainian state into line with European standards of governance. These requirements also lead to the establishment of anti-corruption mechanisms at local and national levels to strengthen state institutions in the face of predatory practices which had helped to shape the political and economic system since the mid-1990s, against a backdrop of a weak rule of law.

Historically, opposition to European integration has been driven mainly by political and economic parties and actors who advocate maintaining strong ties with Russia. This divide was particularly evident in the electoral geography of the mid-2000s, with the heavily industrialized south-east favoring Viktor Yanukovych, the candidate of the ‘Party of Regions’, whilst the center and west supported the liberal and pro-European candidate Viktor Yushchenko. Prior to the Russian intervention in 2014, heavy industry benefited from outlets in the Russian market, whilst the industrial and oligarchic groups that dominated it had helped to shape a rentier economy, based on their links with political power and privileged access to state resources. In 2013, however, regardless of their regional roots, a section of the economic elite-whose interests were served by opening to European markets-supported the Maidan protests and the pro-European stance in the face of the predatory practices of Viktor Yanukovych’s presidential clan. For a section of Ukrainian society, the European path also represents an opportunity to break with these practices by bringing the state into line with European requirements for transparency and accountability on the part of those in power; collective perceptions thus link closer ties with the EU to the transformation of a political and economic model inherited from the post-Soviet period.

After 2014, the political forces associated with this ‘pro-Russian’ movement largely united within the ‘Opposition Bloc’; a split within this bloc in late 2018 gave rise to the ‘Opposition Platform - For Life’, the main political force within this movement, which came second in parliament with a total of 13% of the vote in the 2019 parliamentary elections, behind the presidential party (43.16%), which secured an absolute majority. The Opposition Bloc advocates, in particular, for a neutral and non-aligned Ukraine, as well as negotiations with Moscow to end the war in the Donbas. The Opposition Platform also proposes revising the terms of free trade with the EU, putting forward social and industrial arguments relating to the protection of jobs and sectors that remain dependent on the Russian market.

Whilst the European orientation has been enshrined in the Ukrainian Constitution since 2019, the 2022 invasion has led to an acceleration of the process of accession to the European Union, for which the agreement signed in 2014 was not, in itself, a prerequisite. On 28 February 2022, four days after the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine submitted its application and was officially granted candidate country status on 23 June of the same year. At the political level, the large-scale Russian invasion and the imposition of martial law profoundly altered Ukraine’s institutional balance, with power becoming centralized around the Office of the President and the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC). This new configuration was accompanied by intense legislative activity driven by the requirements of the integration process. Although its members continued to sit in parliament, the pro-Russian opposition found itself restricted by the suspension in March 2022 of the activities of several parties. Among them, the ‘Opposition Platform - For Life’ was banned by the courts in June 2022, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court. At the same time, its co-founder Viktor Medvedchuk - an oligarch close to Vladimir Putin whose television channels were broadcasting Russian propaganda and who had already been subject to sanctions since 2021 - was arrested and handed over to Russia as part of a prisoner exchange.

Among the general public, large support for integration

Opposition to the accession process, which has long been embodied by these parties, is therefore now very much in the minority, whilst support for European integration is growing considerably amongst the population. According to a survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, whilst in June 2021 52 per cent of respondents said they would vote in favor of EU accession if a referendum were held, by July 2022 this figure had risen to 81%. Although this figure has now fallen slightly, it still stood at 70% in June 2026 and remains a majority view across all regions of the country, including the unoccupied territories in the south and east - areas historically more favorable to maintaining ties with Russia. In addition to the desire to break away from the Soviet past and from Moscow, the polls show that the population’s motivations center primarily on the desire to guarantee Ukraine’s long-term security (59%), as well as the economic prospects offered by integration (57%), and the guarantee of the rule of law, democracy and international recognition of Ukraine’s place in Europe.

In the context of the accession process and in accordance with the terms of the Ukraine Facility, macroeconomic support is conditional upon progress being made on reforms aimed at aligning laws and institutions with EU standards. These conditionalities thus help to support reforms called for by civil society since 2014, particularly those aimed at combating systemic corruption and strengthening the rule of law. In a survey conducted in July-August 2025, at a time when the government had attempted to curtail the independence of anti-corruption bodies, 62% cited support for these institutional mechanisms as one of the most relevant forms of EU assistance, ranking it even higher than support for investigations into war crimes and assistance to the populations of liberated territories.

Integration vs. reforms: Ukraine at war, facing the challenge of its candidacy

However, whilst support for accession has remained strong since 2022, it has also given rise to concerns about the economic and social effects of the integration process. Among those cited are fears of rising prices, the exodus of skilled workers and additional costs for businesses. These concerns have also centered on the content of certain reforms, such as the 2023 reform of the Labor Code. Presented as a modernization of the code inherited from the Soviet era, this reform drew criticism from trade unions over deregulation that could weaken collective bargaining and social dialogue. Furthermore, certain sectors, already severely affected by the destruction caused by the war, are finding themselves under strain as they adapt to European standards. For example, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which imposes a carbon cost on products imported into the European Union comparable to that borne by European producers, is having a significant impact on heavy industry, particularly the steel sector, where many factories have already been destroyed, are inaccessible (such as Azovstal and the Ilitch plant in Mariupol, which has been occupied by Russian forces since 2022) or at a standstill due to Russian air strikes, such as ArcelorMittal in Kryvyi Rih, the country’s largest steel complex. According to estimates by the GMK Centre, Ukrainian exports of certain steel products are reported to have already fallen by 64% in the first two months of 2026 compared with 2025, and payments linked to the CBAM mechanism on exports could reach up to 1.2 billion euros over the period 2026-2030.

As Ukraine prepares to enter its fifth year of full scale war, it must therefore carry out structural reforms linked to its European integration, whilst dealing with the economic consequences of the war. Certain civil society organizations, which are heavily involved in monitoring the accession process, have also warned of the risk of ‘cosmetic reforms’ and emphasized the need to monitor their effective implementation. In this context, the domestic challenges associated with European integration now center on the ability of Ukrainian institutions to effectively carry out the expected reforms, whilst managing to mitigate their social and economic costs and remaining vigilant regarding the varying effects they may have across different sectors of activity.

Copyright NICOLAS TUCAT / AFP
European Council President António Costa, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Brussels on 18 June 2026.