Beneath the Azerbaijan-Turkey Spat May Lie a Greater Crisis of Regional Consequences

There was a time when Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev spoke of the bilateral relationship with Turkey as “one nation, two states.” Back then, they were two steadfast allies bolstered by immense political and economic ties. The “Shusha Declaration,” signed in 2021, had formalized a deep strategic partnership between Baku and Ankara, encompassing not only the supply of oil and natural gas – Azerbaijan’s top resources – but also a mutual defense mechanism in the event of a belligerent attack. The ties are also cultural and linguistic, as the two peoples share the same Turkic language: “Azerbaijanis watch Turkish TV and follow the news there. Children speak Turkish among themselves when they play. Azerbaijan is under heavy Turkish influence,” explains Javid Agha, an Azerbaijani journalist in exile in Poland.

However, serious tensions have emerged between Ankara and Baku in recent weeks, which could have regional repercussions. At first glance, the confrontation appears to be of a religious nature: while Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan advocates for a Turkey rooted in Islam, Azerbaijan champions a form of state secularism inspired by the French “laïcité” model, even though 80% of its population are Shia Muslims. But these tensions actually go much deeper, and reveal major strategic differences between both countries, especially on, both regarding Israel and Armenia. They may even go as far as questioning the very stability of the South Caucasus – a region the size of the Washington state, squeezed between Russia to the north and Iran to the south.

From National to Regional Crisis

All began on September 21, when the Azerbaijani government, ruled with an iron fist by Ilham Aliyev, adopted revised dress code regulations for the country’s schools, banning any clothing deemed inconsistent with secularist principles. Though the hijab is not explicitly mentioned, dozens of young girls wearing headscarves were denied entry to their schools during the first-recorded dress code inspections on October 12. Spontaneous protests by students and teachers broke out in Baku and its suburbs to denounce the new rules, in a country of 10.5 million people where any dissent is severely repressed. Within a single day, authorities announced the arrest of 37 people: protesters spoke of more than 200. Some prominent activists, such as the artist Ilkin Huseynov, were quietly arrested after setting up evening classes for the girls barred from their schools. Access to social media was also restricted.

Turkish outrage did not wait for the protests in Azerbaijan. On September 22, speaking at the United Nations, Erdogan denounced any law banning the wearing of the hijab in the name of freedom of belief, without naming Baku directly. Turkish Islamist parties, which wield significant influence in the country’s political life, demonstrated in front of Azerbaijani consulates. The pro-regime Turkish newspaper Yeni Akit published an op-ed titled: “Wherever there is a headscarf ban, there is always a Zionist hand involved.” The disagreement escalated into open conflict when Oktay Saral, an advisor to the Turkish president, publicly called on Baku to reverse its decision, denouncing an “ideological imposition” by the regime.

The New Azerbaijan Party (YAP), led by Ilham Aliyev, condemned Saral’s remarks, and on October 21, 31 Turkish citizens were barred from entering the country, including members of parliament, journalists, and Fatih Erbakan, the leader of the new Islamist “Prosperity” Party, the third-largest group in parliament. In a press release, the YAP asserted that one Muslim country couldn’t possibly lecture another, and indirectly attacked the Turkish president, criticising his alleged intentions to position himself as the intellectual leader of the Muslim world.

Choosing Between Turkey and Israel

“Erdogan needs his religious voterbase, who hates Aliyev and condemn Azerbaijani secularism,” says Altay Goyushov of the Baku Research Institute, who is in exile in the United States. In Baku, on the other hand, religious rhetoric is seen as a threat to ‘pragmatic’ foreign policy. Control over the practicing Shiite religious minority within the country, whose political voice has been all but crushed, also serves as a credibility message sent to Europeans, who are courting Azerbaijan for its gas and crude oil to mitigate the negative effects of the Russian invasion on Ukraine, coupled with the war in Iran.

But the issue of religion is only the tip of the iceberg, under which lies a much deeper tension: the partnership that Baku has forged with Israel since the early 2010s. The objective, above all military, has always been twofold: Azerbaijan needed weapons and ammunition to launch its belligerent campaign against Armenia and occupy the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, which it would eventually do by force in 2023, at the cost of the forced exile of the Armenian population living there. Baku also needs to defend itself against its powerful neighbour and foe, Iran, but wishes to do so without any military dependence on more powerful regional actors, first and foremost Russia and Turkey. Against military weaponry and equipment, Baku would supply Israel with 40-45% of its crude oil needs, which it still does to this day. A state of play that does not serve Ankara’s interests,which has been a long-time critic of the Israeli government, and cut off all bilateral trade with the Jewish state in 2024, against the backdrop of an ever-worsening military and humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.

“When war breaks out in Iran [in February 2026], the Iranians bomb the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan. Aliyev’s response is firm, but the Turks, for their part, want to avoid a regional escalation at all costs. Rather than supporting Baku, they demand proof of loyalty by disowning Israel,” a co-belligerent with the United States, Altay Goyushov continues. Baku refuses; instead, it makes no secret of its support for Benjamin Netanyahu. When the Israeli prime minister addressed the UNGeneral Assembly in September, the Azerbaijani ambassador was the only representative of a Muslim country to remain in the hall, while all others walked out in solidarity with Gaza. “Azerbaijan has absolutely no intention of downgrading its ties with Israel, despite pressure from Turkey and the catastrophe unfolding in Gaza. This partnership is not directed against other states, but serves Azerbaijan’s sovereign interests,” explains Baku-based independent policy analyst Fuad Shahbazov.

U.S. Interests Under Threat

Tensions between the two countries, particularly over the Israeli issue, are not new, but the scale of this latest spat is arguably unmatched - so much so that analysts have warned the overall stability of the South Caucasus region may be at risk if these divisions were to worsen.

First, the United States. Washington has shown great interest in asserting itself diplomatically in a region long considered under Moscow’s shadow. As early as August 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Azerbaijani president laid the groundwork for a peace agreement signed under the auspices of Donald Trump, bringing an end to 40 years of conflict. There, a promise was made to build new trade infrastructures, known as TRIPP (“Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity”), which would connect Baku to Nakhchivan, which borders Turkey, through southern Armenia. Such an initiative, which in itself has helped to cement peace, could be made more complicated if the rift worsens. “The strategic challenge for the U.S. government is to make sure that America’s Caucasus bet can survive a quarrel between the two allies and an assault from regional adversaries.,” writes Kamran Bokhari, a professor of international relations at Georgetown University, in a Forbes op-ed.

There is more to the story: Ankara and Baku, which have long been perfectly aligned on the Armenian issue, are showing signs of divergence. Since the invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, Turkey has consistently made it clear that its normalization of diplomatic relations with Yerevan, including the reopening of the border, which has been sealed since 1993, would be contingent on the progress in peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. But these have stalled: for any peace agreement to see the light of day, Baku is demanding of Yerevan a rewrite of the Armenian Constitution. A move rendered virtually impossible after the June 2026 parliamentary elections, when Nikol Pashinyan’s party, though still the strongest force in Parliament, failed to secure the two-thirds majority it needs to amend the Constitution. Given this, Turkish-Armenian relations now appear to be quietly taking on their own pace, irrespective of the Azerbaijani agenda. There were two high-level meetings between the Armenian prime minister and President Erdogan in September and October 2026. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said on October 16 that the border between both countries could reopen any day. Yet another crack in the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance that could, over time, were it to continue, show the implementation of the U.S.-backed infrastructure project.

“The Russians will do everything to undermine Aliyev”

Iran is also maneuvering to build political capital off of this crisis. Tehran views the TRIPP project with great suspicion. It is in direct competition to the existing transport roads between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, which necessarily pass through northern Iran. Not to mention the alliance between Baku and Israel, which poses an existential threat to the mullahs’ regime. In the name of protecting Shiite interests in the region, including Azerbaijanis, Iranian Vice President Mohammad-Reza Aref has already invited the young women who were barred from entering their schools to continue their studies in Iran. On October 16, Baku announced that it had been the target of cyberattacks claimed by a pro-Iranian hacker group, who promised to “completely destroy the government’s digital infrastructure.”

And then there is Russia, whose influence in the Caucasus has been waning for several years. Bilateral relations with Baku soured when an Azerbaijan Airlines plane crashed in Kazakhstan in December 2024 after being struck by a Russian anti-aircraft missile: Ilham Aliyev subsequently accused Moscow of premeditating the attack. The Kremlin could benefit from increasing regional instability to attempt to reestablish itself as a peacemaker. For the past month, pro-Russian Telegram channels have been stoking anti-Aliyev sentiment and fanning the flames of Turkish Islamist anger. “The Russian propaganda machine is trying to show that Muslims will be freer in Russia than in Azerbaijan. The Russians will do everything they can to undermine Aliyev,” said Altay Goyushov of the Baku Research Institute.

There is no sign that calm will return anytime soon. Ilham Aliyev, who was invited to Ankara on October 30 for the Organization of Turkic States summit, did not show up: a first in 15 years. Erdogan is now set to meet with Ilham Aliyev in Baku on November 8, as all eyes are on the future of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

copyright Alexander NEMENOV / AFP