AccueilExpressionsElectrification Amid Tension: Europe, China, and the Action Agenda at COP31 12/11/2026 Electrification Amid Tension: Europe, China, and the Action Agenda at COP31EnvironnementÉnergiePARTAGER Joseph Dellatte Expert résident et Responsable de projets - Climat et énergie Hugo Jennepin Reyero Chargé de projets - Énergie et décarbonation Rosalie Klein Chargée de projets - Programme Asie The 31st United Nations Climate Change Conference opened on November 9 in Antalya. After a previous edition marked by a deadlock in negotiations, hopes for a COP that would result in an ambitious agreement have given way to skepticism about a meeting that could highlight the points of tension among stakeholders. Ahead of two weeks of negotiations, we take stock of what could unfold.COP31 opened this Monday in Antalya with a bleak outlook as the world grapples with the severe consequences of climate change. Europe faced yet another summer of unprecedented heatwaves, droughts, and wildfires; Nepal suffered a devastating flash flood affecting more than 100 000 people at the end of August; and the super El Niño worries scientists and populations alike in South America and Southeast Asia, the regions most affected by the climate phenomenon which is reaching historical highs.Yet, this ecological distress unfolds across a severely fragmented geopolitical landscape. Active regional conflicts have altered traditional channels of diplomatic dialogue, while systemic trade rivalries now dictate multilateral discussions. Although the last month brought some “good news” for climate, such as the reelection of President Lula in Brazil or the Democrats’ landslide victory in the US midterm elections, the environment in which negotiators, companies, and activists alike will operate remains quite unwelcoming. To add to the picture, the global energy system has been affected by strong fossil fuel price volatility following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.In that context, COP31 won’t be the big night of climate multilateralism. Numerous world leaders - Mark Carney, Xi Jinping, Emmanuel Macron, Friedrich Merz, Narendra Modi, and, of course, Donald Trump - have opted to bypass the summit, showing that climate and/or multilateralism is not at the top of their agenda anymore. The governance of the summit itself is also evolving: for the first time, host responsibilities and negotiating authority are split under a joint Turkish-Australian arrangement, with Turkey providing the host venue in Antalya and holding the presidency while Australia leads the formal negotiation tracks.Antalya won’t be Paris, which ended up with the now-famous Paris Agreement 11 years ago. It might not be Dubai either, where negotiators agreed on transitioning away from fossil fuels. COP31 is not expecting, nor expected, to be such a summit. There is a sense of disillusionment with the outcomes of the formal negotiations, which leads to the necessity, shared by the Turkish and Australian co-presidency, for action. Both countries want this COP to be, finally, an implementation COP. Fewer big announcements and more concrete discussions on how to make the transition happen."There is a sense of disillusionment with the outcomes of the formal negotiations".What will Antalya be about?The core negotiating tracks at COP31 reflect a tactical shift toward tangible mechanisms, even as structural disagreements persist across mitigation, adaptation, and finance.The mitigation agenda arrives at Antalya under procedural and political strain. Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), which outline each nation's domestic targets and strategies for climate mitigation and adaptation, remain the bedrock of the Paris Agreement, but 42 states have yet to submit their revised NDC. This lag threatens the preparation for the second Global Stocktake (GST-2), scheduled for COP33 in 2028 (a COP that could potentially be organized by China itself).Following a deeply disappointing COP30, which failed to secure agreement even on previously negotiated language concerning the transition away from fossil fuels, a coalition of willing countries emerged through the Santa Maria initiative to advance discussions on fossil fuel phase-out. Last week, the Brazilian COP30 presidency presented its first global roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels, on a voluntary basis. However, given the persistent diplomatic deadlock surrounding explicit phase-out mandates, electrification has emerged as the most viable surrogate for decarbonization.By framing the energy transition around power-sector modernization and infrastructure deployment, negotiators can advance the phase-down of fossil fuels without provoking automatic vetoes from major hydrocarbon-producing states. A broad coalition of delegations is currently organizing to enshrine a target of 35% electrification of final global energy consumption by 2035 within the Antalya Cover Decision. This objective might be facilitated by the Strait of Hormuz crisis, which led to higher oil and gas prices globally, and became an effective testimony of the importance of sovereign energy.The European Union is expected to be among the strongest advocates of clean electrification at COP31. Its recently presented Electrification Action Plan sets an indicative objective of increasing electricity's share of final energy consumption from approximately 23% today to 46% by 2040, making electrification a central pillar of Europe's decarbonisation, industrial competitiveness and energy security strategies. This ambition is reflected in the EU's negotiating mandate for COP31, which calls for an accelerated clean energy transition in which electrification plays an important role.Against this backdrop, a fundamental negotiating difficulty is emerging. While electrification offers a potentially less contentious alternative to explicit fossil fuel phase-out commitments, electrification alone does not guarantee decarbonisation. Without clear requirements regarding the carbon intensity of electricity generation, a global electrification target could accommodate continued reliance on coal- and gas-fired power. Insisting on clean electricity would therefore strengthen the environmental integrity of the commitment but also make an international agreement more difficult to secure, particularly for developing economies facing rapidly growing electricity demand, insufficient grid infrastructure and significant investment constraints. The central diplomatic challenge at COP31 will thus be to translate the emerging political consensus around electrification into a credible decarbonisation commitment, without reproducing the deadlock that has plagued negotiations on fossil fuels."The central diplomatic challenge at COP31 will thus be to translate the emerging political consensus around electrification into a credible decarbonisation commitment."Climate finance remains one of the defining fault lines of the multilateral climate process. Negotiations are repeatedly drawn into a familiar confrontation between the historical responsibilities of developed economies, the changing economic weight and emissions profiles of major emerging economies, particularly China, and the growing financial needs of developing countries. At its core, this dispute reflects a fundamental tension between the principle of differentiated responsibilities embedded in the Paris Agreement and the profound transformation of the global economy since the international climate regime was first established.The European Union, which contributed €32.3 billion in public international climate finance in 2025, remains one of the world's largest climate finance providers. Yet European negotiators increasingly insist that public budgets alone cannot meet the scale of investment required to finance the global transition. Beyond mobilising private capital and reforming international financial institutions, the EU argues that the circle of contributors must expand to reflect contemporary economic realities, including the growing financial capacity and emissions of major emerging economies.This disagreement repeatedly crystallises around two provisions of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement. Developing countries invoke Article 9.1, which establishes a clear obligation for developed countries: "Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention".Developed economies, in turn, point to Article 9.2, which provides that: "Other Parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily"."The diplomatic impasse centres increasingly on who should pay for climate action."The diplomatic impasse centres increasingly on who should pay for climate action, how binding their commitments should be, and how responsibility should be shared. For many developing countries, broadening the contributor base risks diluting the legally established commitments of developed economies. For the EU and other traditional donors, maintaining a financing architecture built around an increasingly outdated division between developed and developing countries risks undermining both its credibility and its capacity to deliver at the scale required. As COP31 approaches, this unresolved tension threatens once again to overshadow negotiations on the practical mechanisms needed to mobilise and deploy climate finance. France, co-facilitating this negotiation track alongside the Philippines, has asserted that European delegations will not discuss revisions to Article 9.1 commitments without meaningful movement toward formalizing Article 9.2 contributions from wealthier non-Annex I parties. The former supports public-private structures, de-risking guarantees, and multilateral development bank reforms. Along with EU partners, it also wants to open to fund allocation discussions, be it for mitigation or for adaptation.Preserving the authority of scientific consensus will also be critical; without it, negotiations risk deteriorating into unanchored political clashes. Delegations defending institutional integrity are focused on safeguarding formal linkages between the UNFCCC and allied environmental treaties, ensuring that scientific guardrails remain anchored within the final Antalya texts.Europe: Architect, Standard-Setter, or Diplomatic Scapegoat?The European Union enters COP31 facing a (now common) paradox. While it remains the most comprehensive architect of green regulation and the largest provider of international climate finance, it finds itself diplomatically isolated and increasingly vulnerable to external pushback. After a disappointing COP last year in Belém, the bloc arrives with clearer stances and discourses, notably under the direction of the Irish Presidency of the Council, but also with broader challenges.European domestic climate and economic policies will dominate corridors and working groups in Antalya. Three regulatory pillars stand at the center of debate: the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA).On the ETS, the prospective linking of European carbon markets with Article 6 international offset frameworks raises complex questions regarding environmental integrity, accounting rules, and cross-border fungibility. It, however, gives negotiating leeways to European delegations and potential influence on climate finance using international carbon credits.Although structured and justified under international trade law as an environmental instrument designed to prevent carbon leakage, CBAM still faces relentless criticism from international partners. Developing nations and emerging industrial competitors routinely categorize the mechanism as unilateral green protectionism.Finally, Europe is bolstering its industrial policy, using, for the first time, access to its single market as an industrial lever with the IAA. Europe’s effort to maintain domestic manufacturing capacity amid aggressive industrial subsidies and support from China has not gone unnoticed, worrying both partners and competitors."The European Union does not speak with a single, harmonious voice."Europe's diplomatic leverage is further constrained by internal political and economic fragmentation. The European Union does not speak with a single, harmonious voice. Member states remain divided over the permissible speed of industrial decarbonization, the fiscal latitude available for external financial support, and the role of nuclear power within green taxonomy frameworks. Furthermore, several national governments struggle internally to maintain consistent inter-ministerial positions across energy, trade, and diplomatic portfolios.This domestic incoherence diminishes Europe’s persuasive power at the negotiating table. Non-European partners routinely find the intricate machinery of European policymaking, governed by complex trialogues, qualified majorities, and evolving directives, opaque and rigid. If Europe is to avoid diplomatic isolation in Antalya, it must learn to articulate how its domestic tools, such as border adjustments and compliance markets, can actively assist third countries through joint technological partnerships, carbon revenue recycling, and capacity building. Europe must stop showcasing its eternal debates and start focusing on advancing the concrete actions taken, seek partners to cooperate under those.China: An Industrial Demonstration of Cleantech Hegemony?While Europe approaches COP31 burdened by internal friction and defensive explanations of its trade-related climate measures, China arrives again with a clear strategic objective. Beijing, as usual for many COPs, will use the Antalya summit as a major diplomatic and industrial showcase. Without showing much more on climate objectives, China is still positioning itself as the leader of real-world climate action and the sole global power capable of supplying the physical hardware required to make the low-carbon transition feasible.The summit's deliberate emphasis on electrification directly plays to China's comparative economic advantages. Over the past decade, Chinese state-backed industrial policy has established commanding control over nearly the entire clean technology value chain. From photovoltaic modules and high-capacity lithium-ion batteries to electric mobility ecosystems and ultra-high-voltage transmission networks, China operates at an industrial scale that Western manufacturing cannot match. For emerging economies in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia, the moral arguments and complex regulatory mechanisms advanced by Western capitals are far less compelling than the practical reality of Chinese technology delivered at competitive prices. By framing the global agenda around a target of 35% electrification by 2035, China can effectively transform the multilateral consensus into a validation of its domestic clean technology sector."By framing the global agenda around a target of 35% electrification by 2035, China can effectively transform the multilateral consensus into a validation of its domestic clean technology sector."This commercial dominance could be paired with a potent diplomatic narrative centered on execution. Recent data indicates that China's domestic greenhouse gas emissions might have left the plateau and started to slowly contract. Beijing can legitimately claim that it is fulfilling the mandate of an "implementation COP". The Chinese delegation can present their country as a pragmatic state that builds, manufactures, and deploys transition infrastructure.On the floor of the negotiations, China has a clear interest in leveraging this posture to continue to play the card of the South-South diplomatic partnerships. If the country gave up Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) under WTO (which does not change its status as a developing country), it still uses and abuses the status of developing economy in the climate arena. This has a massive impact on the way China is playing the climate game. It also has an impact on whether or not Beijing decides to host COP33 in two years and, eventually, how ambitious final deals can be in Antalya, and next year in Ethiopia.China's position illustrates a fundamental contradiction at the heart of international climate negotiations. Beijing consistently resists attempts to broaden mandatory multilateral climate finance obligations to major emerging economies, invoking its developing-country status and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. Yet, this position should not be mistaken for a reluctance to contribute to the global energy transition. Rather, China has been approaching international climate cooperation through the lens of industrial policy, trade and investment for quite some time now, promoting bilateral cooperation, technology deployment and infrastructure development across the Global South. In doing so, Beijing offers an alternative model of climate engagement, one in which the international diffusion of Chinese clean technologies serves both global decarbonisation objectives and China's own economic interests.This strategy is deeply embedded in China's domestic growth model. Clean technologies have become one of the principal engines of Chinese economic expansion, accounting for approximately 11.4% of GDP and more than one-third of economic growth in 2025. The 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) confirms the strategic centrality of advanced manufacturing, technological leadership and international market integration. The plan seeks to consolidate China's industrial competitiveness, strengthen foreign trade and support the international expansion of Chinese companies and supply chains. China's manufacturing capacity in several clean technology sectors already exceeds domestic demand by a considerable margin, making access to international markets essential to sustaining industrial activity, employment and economic growth.China's international climate diplomacy must, once again, also be understood as an extension of its industrial development strategy. By presenting affordable clean technologies as a contribution to global development, Beijing can credibly argue that its manufacturing capacity is accelerating decarbonisation, particularly in emerging economies where access to low-cost equipment remains essential. At the same time, these exports help absorb Chinese industrial production, preserve economies of scale and consolidate its position across strategic value chains.The distinction between climate cooperation and industrial expansion is consequently becoming increasingly blurred. For China, supporting the global energy transition is not merely an international responsibility; it is also a means of sustaining its domestic growth model and shaping the industrial geography of the twenty-first century. This creates an increasingly consequential tension in climate diplomacy, while developed economies seek broader financial contributions from China, Beijing can point to its industrial investments, exports and South-South cooperation as evidence that it is already making a substantial contribution to global decarbonisation, albeit through mechanisms that also reinforce its own economic competitiveness and strategic influence."If Europe arrives in Antalya as a defensive regulator, China approaches, yet again, COP31 as an industrial juggernaut executing a clear strategic demonstration."If Europe arrives in Antalya as a defensive regulator, China approaches, yet again, COP31 as an industrial juggernaut executing a clear strategic demonstration. Beijing is positioning itself as the indispensable leader of the low-carbon transition, grounded not in diplomacy, but in unrivalled manufacturing scale and export capacity.Realism and the New Geoeconomics of Climate ActionCOP31 will not bring back the era of institutional optimism that produced the Paris Agreement. The gathering in Antalya demonstrates that climate diplomacy is now fully subsumed within geoeconomic rivalry, trade questions, and industrial competition.For the EU, navigating this landscape requires shedding procedural innocence. Defending internal mechanisms while shouldering the majority of international finance without diplomatic leverage is an unsustainable posture. Europe must link its regulatory power directly to strategic industrial alliances, providing viable alternatives to Chinese clean-tech monopolies while preserving its own domestic industrial base.For the international community, an "implementation COP" stripped of soaring rhetoric carries the undeniable virtue of forcing parties to confront the physical and industrial realities of the transition. The true measure of COP31 will be set by its pragmatic targets on electrification, adaptation planning, and capital mobilization, bridging the gap between escalating climate impacts and an increasingly fragmented world.copyright Ozan KOSE / AFPPARTAGERcontenus associés 25/11/2025 COP30 - Faut-il préserver le multilatéralisme climatique quoi qu’il en coût... Joseph Dellatte 15/07/2026 Le marché carbone est aussi un pilier central de notre politique industriel... Joseph Dellatte Environnement et climat :faire de la transition écologique une force Les repères de Montaigne