Iran: President Trump’s Failed War

The war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran on February 28 has had paradoxical consequences. On the one hand, it has led to some kind of governance renewal in the Islamic Republic, ushering in younger, more radical, and less religious leaders-who remain faithful to Ayatollah Khamenei’s legacy. On the other hand, it has resulted in a growing awareness in Tehran of the country’s ability to hold the global economy hostage. Iranian leaders were not unaware of this leverage, but they have now received striking proof of its effectiveness.

This does not mean, of course, that Iran has not emerged weakened from this ordeal: its economy is in shambles, its military capabilities-ballistic and otherwise-have been severely curtailed, and its network of proxies in the region, already greatly diminished by the loss of Syria more than a year ago, is now but a shadow of its former self. As for the Iranian people, as far as we can tell, they are suffering terribly from the economic slump and feel they have been betrayed by the United States. For now, they are struggling to survive, though it is likely they will rise again one day 

For his part, the U.S. president, a few weeks after the start of operations, found himself facing a dilemma. To either continue in order to secure Tehran’s "surrender"-announced many times-but, as Mr. Trump candidly pointed out, at the cost of lasting destabilization of the oil market and a high price for the United States.Or to settle for a semblance of an agreement that would allow him to "cut his losses," as said in the business world.

That is the choice Washington made with the "memorandum of understanding" signed by Mr. Trump in Versailles (followed by Iranian President Pezeshkian in Tehran).

The Chances of a Settlement

This memorandum of understanding has one merit, as noted by President Macron: it allows for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and-gradually-a return to a more favorable situation in the hydrocarbon market. It opens up a much more hypothetical prospect: that of negotiating a genuine nuclear agreement within two months, renewable. In the "memorandum of understanding," the option-at the conclusion of these negotiations-for the Strait of Hormuz to be managed by its riparian states-in other words, a disguised toll-is clearly left open, even though it contravenes international law. Regarding Iran’s missile arsenal, Mr. Trump is now saying in one of his nonstop interviews that "Iran must be able to defend itself, just like any other country."

As is always the case with the Trump administration,just as it was when the fighting ceased in Gaza,the "deal" includes the promise of a flood of dollars: the unfreezing of certain Iranian assets (in the range of $15 to $20 billion) and the lifting of restrictions on Iranian oil exports, effective upon the signing of the preliminary agreement; and all sorts of long-term commitments, including the creation of a massive fund for Iran’s reconstruction ($300 billion), should the nuclear negotiations succeed. This reflects a typically Trumpian strategic calculation: to drown out resistance with the guarantee of a financial windfall.

Can this really work? The precedent of Gaza invites skepticism. But in the case of Iran, there is more:

• When it comes to the nuclear issue, Iran’s current leaders are clear-headed enough to understand that blackmailing the world by threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz will eventually reach its limits, particularly because the affected countries will take steps to reduce their dependence on maritime traffic; there is therefore reason to fear that, in fact, in Tehran, the appeal of the "access to a nuclear bomb" option may emerge strengthened from this war: this would be another paradoxical-and, to say the least, major-consequence of the conflict.

• As for the financial aspect, it seems likely that economic motives prompted Iranian leaders to accept the olive branch offered by Donald Trump. For now, Tehran simply has a pressing need for cash to prevent the country from being completely strangled.
   

In the long run, however, other considerations may take precedence. Thus, given the influence wielded by the Revolutionary Guards within the Iranian leadership, there is reason to fear that the "financial windfall" Tehran will receive will be directed toward military needs and maintaining the loyalty of its proxies rather than toward the economy. Furthermore, there is a temptation among Iran’s new leaders-following the precedent set by Putin and his associates-to seek alignment with the Chinese economy rather than integration into the Western economic system; such integration would, in their view, carry the risk that, at the first opportunity, the fickle United States would resume its sanctions policy.

It is perhaps in light of these observations that we must understand the speed with which Iran once again blocked the Strait of Hormuz in response to "Israel’s failure to respect the ceasefire in Lebanon" (see below): the Iranians want to emerge from the current crisis, but only on the condition that the outcome aligns with their priorities.

The Shock Waves

It would be tempting to leave it at that observation which is full of uncertainties. Yet we must take it further. We have just touched upon the issue of priorities from Tehran’s perspective. Everything suggests that, to Iranian leaders, the leverage they wield in Lebanon through Hezbollah is of the utmost importance: they resisted signing a memorandum of understanding with Washington-even when it was clearly to their advantage-as long as Lebanon was not included in the deal. When they met with a U.S. delegation on the tranquil shores of Lake Lucerne, they made it clear from the start that they would walk away from the negotiations without hesitation if their priorities were not met.

The Lebanese leaders, under the leadership of President Aoun, had taken the risk of committing to disarming Hezbollah in exchange for direct negotiations with Israel; they now find themselves caught between a rock and a hard place: Iran’s influence in the Switzerland of the Middle East is confirmed; Israel is not about to give up either its occupation of southern Lebanon or its attacks on the country.

Furthermore, it is highly likely that Jerusalem will strive to derail the process set in motion at Versailles. With the general elections scheduled for October at the latest, this is in the personal interest of Mr. Netanyahu, who has suffered a humiliating defeat in this matter (exacerbated by the tone in which Mr. Trump and Mr. Vance now speak to him). Israeli public opinion remains overwhelmingly concerned about the Iranian threat.

As for the shockwaves of this war-which the United States and Israel may not have lost, but certainly failed to win-let us note three other consequences:
 

• The spectacular rift that has opened between Washington and Jerusalem, at a time when, as Mr. Vance cruelly pointed out, the State of Israel’s image around the world has been deeply tarnished. In this world of self-important leaders, it would be surprising if Mr. Trump did not hold a grudge against Mr. Netanyahu for dragging him into this adventure; but it is, at a much deeper level, the bond between Israel and the majority of American public opinion that is now being called into question;
• The uncertainties weighing on the Gulf States and their economic, social, and ultimately security models: confidence in U.S. protection of these countries, their relations with Iran on one side and Israel on the other, and their positioning as major hubs of the global economy-these are all questions now faced by these States.
• Finally, the impact of this conclusion-admittedly provisional-of the war on America’s image around the world. How do China, the Global South, and America’s allies in Asia and Europe view the role of the United States today?

This would be a topic worthy of its own discussion, exploring it from multiple perspectives. We will put forward a proposal to kick off the debate: it is not the power of the United States that is in question; militarily and economically, it remains unrivaled in the world; it is America’s capacity for leadership that has been undermined.

A Roadmap for Europe?

A final word as we turn our attention to Europe: marginalized throughout recent weeks, and at times even threatened by Washington, Europeans have emerged from this third Gulf War (1991, 2003, 2025-26) less battered than others. Mr. Trump’s presence in Évian and then in Versailles attests to this. The American president, a political animal through and through, has clearly understood that, under the current circumstances, he cannot afford to treat his allies with too much condescension.

At the G7, the Europeans did not hold back in their support for Donald Trump regarding the outcome of the war with Iran. In exchange, they appear to have secured the beginnings of a renewed commitment from the U.S. administration on the Ukrainian issue. Perhaps they also have a window of opportunity to re-enter the Middle East arena, particularly on three fronts:

• Involvement in negotiations with Iran; the pretext for this could be to draw on the E3’s (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the EU) nuclear expertise, stemming from the role they played in negotiating the JCPOA, but fundamentally, it is on the political front that a broader negotiating framework would make sense;
• A renewed push for action on behalf of Gaza and, more broadly, Palestine; an important meeting could take place in this regard at this year’s United Nations General Assembly; many countries will indeed want to take stock of last year’s "peace plan", as formalized by Security Council Resolution 2803 (November 17, 2025) but in practice driven by Washington;
• Finally, a commitment-if not Euro-American, then at least Franco-American-to resolving the crisis in Lebanon. This, however, presupposes that Israel lifts its veto against France: is this conceivable given the changed circumstances? Or would it be easier to imagine after the elections in Israel?
   

Copyright ALEX WONG / GETTY IMAGES NORTH AMERICA / Getty Images via AFP
Donald Trump at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland on June 19.