A New European Left?

Should we see a fundamental movement and a sign of a shift and renewal of the left in Europe?

It seems to me that what is being described cannot properly be considered a genuine "wave" of the European left. Rather, all the cases mentioned point to the left’s capacity for resilience and adaptation within a highly competitive political environment whose dominant trend continues to favor the right and, more specifically, the radical right.

In my view, the issues that currently dominate international political debate - both in Europe and beyond - particularly those related to immigration management (framed almost exclusively in terms of security and protectionism), together with questions of nativist exclusivism, cultural supremacism, and political sovereignty, are contributing to the consolidation of a conservative radical mindset. In certain circumstances, this development risks undermining the social pact built around the principles of democratic citizenship and equality of conditions.

Against this backdrop, the left continues, to varying degrees and depending on the national context, to retain a measure of political competitiveness that enables it to form governments in a number of European countries. However, within the constraints of the prevailing context - which in recent years has been marked by significant reductions in public spending, declining employment levels, and cuts to welfare services (some of which were also endorsed by centre-left governments) the instruments of government do not always coincide with the instruments of change.

For this reason, the left has often encountered periods of difficulty at the end of certain governing experiences, followed by corresponding electoral defeats.

In all of this, it is important to distinguish between the different families of the European left.

The socialist and social-democratic parties have long operated within a firmly pro-European and reformist framework, seeking to reconcile economic growth with social inclusion. The radical left, by contrast, advances a more far-reaching, root-and-branch critique of the effects of contemporary capitalism and neoliberal policies. Yet it remains a minority force in most cases, even though in certain contexts - most notably Greece and Spain - it succeeded in carving out a significant political space during the period of austerity.

What is certain is that the principal challenge facing the left today is the reconstruction of a broad social base. Many left-wing parties now draw their strongest support from urban, educated, and cosmopolitan constituencies, often losing touch with workers, peripheral communities, and broader popular sectors. It is precisely on this terrain that the right has been able to build much of its recent success, presenting itself as the voice of social discontent and of the anxieties associated with globalization, immigration, and the crisis of political representation.

Within the European left, which countries and parties do you find the most dynamic? How do you analyze the balance of power between the radical left and the center-left?

With the decline of grand ideological frameworks and the succession of economic and financial crises that, over the past two decades, have disproportionately affected working-class and lower-income groups, the most effective parties on the left have been those capable of combining governmental responsibility with political innovation. In this respect, among the socialist left, despite the many difficulties it continues to face, Pedro Sánchez’s PSOE in Spain has been able to channel much of the discontent that emerged in the aftermath of 2011, when the Indignados generation became a prominent political force. It has sought to translate into government policy many of the demands that first arose through the protest movements of those years, notwithstanding the significant challenges recently experienced by both the Spanish government and the Socialist Party itself.

On the radical left, the most significant experiences have been those of Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain. Yet both, after their years in government or close proximity to power, encountered substantial difficulties, culminating in the near-disappearance of Podemos and the retreat of Syriza from its previous central position in Greek politics.

Within the broader landscape of the European radical left, the most notable exception to have retained a significant degree of political relevance is La France Insoumise. Under the leadership of Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the movement continues to occupy a central place within the French left, while advancing positions that are often characterized as populist and, at times, Bonapartist in nature.

More generally, with regard to the relationship between the radical left and the centre-left, recent years have witnessed a rebalancing in favour of socialist and social-democratic forces. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, some observers suggested that parties such as Syriza and Podemos might eventually replace the struggling socialist parties and emerge as the principal alternative on the European left. In reality, this did not occur. Indeed, today in many European countries, the radical left finds itself facing the greatest difficulties.

Although its critiques of the neoliberal model and its calls for greater equality and social justice remain intellectually influential, these positions have generally failed to translate into sustained electoral support. As a result, the radical left has struggled to broaden its appeal beyond its core constituencies and to establish itself as a credible governing alternative in most European political systems.

What are the dynamics of left-wing unity in Europe, and how do you judge their coherence and the effectiveness of their electoral strategies? Are left-wing parties more inclined toward alliances with the radical left or with the center? How does it differ between European countries?

The dynamics of left-wing unity in Europe today vary considerably from one country to another and reflect the growing fragmentation of that political space. Alliances tend to follow a fluid and highly context-dependent pattern, shaped by national political circumstances, the balance of power among parties, and the legacies of previous political experiences. They are also, of course, influenced by institutional arrangements, electoral systems, and the distinctive political culture of each country.
On the whole, unity on the left tends to be more successful when it is built around a shared political programme rather than merely around the selection of a prominent or representative leader. In practice, however, the opposite is often the case. I am thinking, for example, of Italy, where the various components of the left have historically found common ground more easily around a leadership figure than around a coherent and consistent policy agenda. This has frequently produced problematic outcomes and has often limited the durability and effectiveness of left-wing coalitions.

What are the left's strategies when facing the right and the far-right? Can left-wing parties benefit from a debate with the far-right to define their project (beyond the sole question of electoral strategy)?

Paradoxically, the radicalization of political discourse on the right could serve as a stimulus for left-wing parties, for two fundamental reasons. First, it may encourage them to recover a distinctive political vision of their own - one that, after 1989-91, risked falling into crisis across much of Europe. Today, articulating a specifically left-wing approach to the major political issues of our time is neither straightforward nor easy.
Take immigration, for example. On this issue, the right has developed a relatively clear "exclusivist" position, with some of its more extreme currents even advocating the unworkable idea of "remigration". The left, by contrast, lacks a single, clearly defined stance, or rather encompasses a range of different and sometimes competing positions. This ambiguity is not advantageous for contemporary left-wing parties, as it can weaken both their political message and their ability to present a coherent alternative to the electorate.

At the European Union level, the left is united in the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), which has 136 members of parliament. What are the points of convergence between the different parties that compose it? And what are the points of division?

Within the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) Group, there coexist political forces with different histories, political cultures, and policy priorities, although in some cases these are more closely aligned than in others. Among the issues that unite them, I would highlight two in particular.
The primary point of convergence is their support for the European social democratic model, which combines - or seeks to combine - a market economy with social protection, the fight against inequality, the defence of the rule of law, and the protection and expansion of civil and citizenship rights.
Secondly, another important area of convergence concerns certain welfare-related issues. In terms of policy priorities such as the protection of workers’ rights, the fight against poverty, and the reduction of inequalities, the majority of European left-wing parties share a more interventionist approach than liberal or conservative political forces.

By contrast, among the issues that divide the parties of the European left, the first to be considered is economic policy. Some parties, particularly those in Northern Europe, tend to adopt more fiscally cautious approaches, whereas parties in Southern Europe are generally more supportive of expansionary policies and of greater solidarity-based mechanisms.

A second point of division, in addition to the immigration issue already mentioned, concerns relations with the radical left. Some parties, such as the PSOE in Spain and the Democratic Party (PD) in Italy, have in recent years shown a greater willingness to form electoral alliances and governing coalitions with radical left parties when political circumstances have required it. Others, such as Germany’s SPD, have repeatedly been reluctant to cooperate with Die Linke, instead favouring more moderate alliances or participation in a Große Koalition (grand coalition).

How do different left parties in Europe approach European integration and enlargement? In France, the far-left party La France insoumise is very critical of the EU. Are similar positions expressed by the left or far-left parties in Europe?

Issues relating to European integration and enlargement represent one of the main lines of division between the centre-left and the radical left.

The socialist and social democratic parties affiliated with the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) are all firmly pro-European. The PSOE, the SPD, the British Labour Party (despite the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union), the Portuguese Socialist Party, and Italy’s Democratic Party, to name only a few, regard European integration as the conditio sinequa non for addressing the most important political challenges of our time. These challenges include international affairs, security, the green transition, and energy and industrial policy.

When criticism does emerge, it is generally directed at the EU’s current institutional framework rather than at the legitimacy of the European project itself. Indeed, these parties tend to advocate reforms aimed at making the Union more democratic, effective, and socially responsive, rather than questioning the value or necessity of European integration as such.

The situation is more complex when it comes to radical left parties. During the years of the Eurozone crisis, many of these parties voiced strong criticism of the European Union, which they perceived as both the arena and the instrument of neoliberal policies grounded in the principle of fiscal austerity.
Nevertheless, important distinctions can also be found within the radical left itself. Parties such as La France Insoumise, Podemos, Syriza, and many others may be described as Eurocritical rather than anti-European. They support the idea of a more integrated Europe - often expressed through the vision of a "United States of Europe" - while at the same time criticising, sometimes quite forcefully, the EU’s economic policies, the constraints imposed by fiscal rules, and the economic orientation embedded in the European treaties. Their objective is not to abandon the European project, but rather to pursue a profound reform of the European Union along more socially oriented and democratically accountable lines.
Alongside these parties, however, there are more hard-line formations, including the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), which regard the EU as a fundamentally neoliberal structure that should be overcome and ultimately abandoned. From their perspective, meaningful social and economic transformation requires a break with the existing framework of European integration and, ultimately, withdrawal from the Union itself.

In more recent years, however, the experience of Brexit and developments in the international geopolitical environment have weakened the more Eurosceptic positions within the radical left, reinforcing the view that the major challenges of the contemporary world can hardly be addressed effectively at the national level alone. As a result, the main dividing lines today are no longer centred on a simple "EU: yes or no" choice; rather, they concern competing visions of what Europe should be and how the European Union should evolve.

Ecology, growth, inequalities, pensions…: what are the main themes highlighted by the center-left, and how do you analyze their recent evolution? Do you see an alignment between voter concerns and the priorities of political leaders?

After the decades straddling the twentieth and twenty-first centuries - when even socialist and social democratic forces had become convinced of the "end of history" and of the need to organize political and economic life within what was perceived as the only viable framework, namely the rules imposed by neoliberal capitalism - the situation appears to have changed significantly.

The main impetus for this shift has come from the social consequences of the economic and financial crises that followed the end of the "Short Twentieth Century". These crises contributed to the weakening of the middle class and fuelled growing discontent among broad segments of society. It was during these years that social groups, reacting against the effects of globalization, began to mobilize politically, often showing increasing receptiveness to the security-oriented narratives promoted by conservative and far-right parties.

In response to this changing context, issues such as the cost of living, access to affordable housing, the quality of employment, social protection, and environmental sustainability have once again become central themes in the programmes of European centre-left parties. These concerns now occupy a prominent place in their political agendas, reflecting a renewed emphasis on social justice, economic security, and the need to address the inequalities generated by contemporary economic transformations. 
The same applies to the issue of equality. Despite the significant rise in inequality - well documented by leading economists around the world - the question of social cohesion has once again become a central concern for parties of the left. These political forces are increasingly convinced that economic competitiveness must be accompanied by public investment, robust welfare services, and effective measures to protect both employment and workers’ rights. This marks a significant departure from the position adopted by many socialist and social democratic parties during the 1990s, when the imperatives of economic modernisation often took precedence over redistributive concerns.

Against this backdrop, an issue that remains worthy of careful reflection is the persistent gap between the priorities of left-wing parties and those of their electorate. In my view, a substantial degree of misalignment still exists. Indeed, despite the renewed emphasis on certain themes traditionally associated with the left, centre-left leaderships continue to place considerable importance on post-materialist concerns. Issues such as climate transition, European integration, and civil rights occupy a prominent place in the electoral programmes of these political forces.

By contrast, a significant share of the electorate appears to be primarily concerned with the protection of material interests, which have paradoxically been undermined by the very capitalist crises referred to above. Secure and high-quality employment, contractual stability, purchasing power, economic security, and the quality of public services have once again become top priorities for a large segment of the European electorate. Many citizens have experienced a deterioration in their individual and collective living standards over recent decades and increasingly expect political parties to address these concerns directly and effectively.

Part of the explanation for the rise of Europe’s radical right-wing parties may well be found in this gap. The issue is not that citizens and voters have abandoned their concern for social justice; rather, it is the perception that the political agenda of the European left has, in recent years, shifted away from material concerns at a time when these have once again become an urgent priority. It is from this perception that the powerful mechanism of enemy construction can emerge, identifying the "foreigner" - and the transformation of society symbolised by the presence of the "foreigner" in "our" streets, "our" neighbourhoods, and "our" cities - as the focus of social and political resentment. This reaction has provided fertile ground for the narratives of the right and the radical right, helping to fuel their electoral and political advance.

In Barcelona, on April 18, Pedro Sanchez hosted a summit with twelve left-wing leaders: what were the main topics of discussion, and along what guidelines can such a union take place?

The Barcelona Summit of 18 April, promoted by Pedro Sánchez together with Lula da Silva, represented an attempt to coordinate a range of political forces from different geographical regions around the shared goals of defending democracy and strengthening multilateralism. The agenda encompassed a wide variety of issues. Among the most significant were: the defence of democracy against the rise of the radical right and the resurgence of authoritarian tendencies in Europe and elsewhere; the strengthening of multilateral cooperation in response to the prevailing "America First" approach; the fight against economic and social inequalities; efforts to counter disinformation, including challenges related to the role of digital platforms; and the promotion of the ecological transition.

From a political standpoint, the meeting succeeded in fostering convergence among different progressive and left-wing forces around a number of shared principles. However, I do not believe that this initiative is capable of laying the foundations for a new international movement of the global left. The differences between European and Latin American actors, as well as among the various political forces that participated in the summit, remain substantial. Rather, the initiative should be understood as an effort to identify common ground among progressive forces and to develop shared objectives and instruments aimed at countering the advance of nationalist-populist right-wing movements.

The debate in France very frequently returns to the Zucman tax (a 2% minimum wealth tax on the ultra-rich) defended by the left. How is this tax perceived by left-wing parties in Europe and abroad (in the United States, Mamdani met Gabriel Zucman last April)? What proposals are being put forward regarding inequality?

In Italy, Sinistra Italiana, a radical left party allied with the Democratic Party within the broad centre-left coalition, advocates the introduction of a wealth tax on large fortunes. However, as in France and elsewhere in Europe, the issue does not appear to attract significant support even among other progressive parties. If anything, it tends to generate divisions within the same political camp.
I do not believe that the political conditions are currently ripe for measures of this kind, nor do I think that the fragmented European left possesses the strength necessary to impose them. Nevertheless, the very fact that such proposals are once again being discussed suggests a renewed willingness to consider redistributive policies. This, in turn, points to the possibility of future developments in that direction, with the aim of narrowing the now enormous gap between a small global wealth-holding elite and the rest of society.

Pedro Sanchez's announcement of the regularization of 500,000 undocumented workers sparked controversies. In Denmark, Mette Frederiksen had on the contrary adopted a hard stance on immigration. What are the left's views and divergences on immigration? Is it changing?

Immigration is perhaps one of the most divisive issues among parties on the left. In recent years, positions advanced by conservative and radical right-wing parties - also in light of the electoral gains they have achieved - have significantly influenced the debate within the left itself, where three broad approaches can be identified.

On one side are the"idealists", who place particular emphasis on the protection of human rights and the principles of social inclusion. In the middle stand the "realists", who, in view of economic and demographic challenges, argue for the acceptance of regulated and managed migration flows. Finally, there are the "hyper-realists", including figures such as Denmark’s Mette Frederiksen and segments of the German left, who, in the name of safeguarding the welfare state, advocate much stricter immigration policies.
On these issues, right-wing and radical right-wing parties tend to present a relatively unified front, whereas parties of the left remain divided among themselves. From this perspective, one might say that there is nothing particularly new under the sun. The tension between universalist principles, economic considerations, and concerns about social cohesion has long been a defining feature of debates on immigration within the European left, and it continues to shape political divisions today.

Do certain left-wing families have a salient discourse on AI and the value of work? What remains of the idea of a universal basic income?

As far as artificial intelligence is concerned, no major line of division has yet emerged among Europe’s left-wing parties comparable to those that have developed over immigration, economic policy, or European integration. Broadly speaking, the shared concern is to prevent the digital revolution from generating a further increase in inequality and an even greater concentration of economic power in the hands of the major technology platforms.

This issue is also linked to the debate on a universal basic income. However, after attracting considerable attention in previous years, interest in the topic appears to have declined significantly. This may be due to concerns about the feasibility of financing such a measure, or perhaps because the issue of work itself - its protection, quality, and social value - has once again moved to the centre of political debate. Indeed, employment now seems to command greater attention than proposals based on the assumption that work might eventually be superseded.

From a political perspective, the challenge facing Europe’s left today is less about imagining a world without work than about finding ways to reconcile technological innovation, industrial productivity, and social justice. It is likely that this will become one of the central battlegrounds of political debate in the years ahead.

Is the focus on cultural issues giving way to a return to social questions?

Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, in their influential book Cultural Backlash (2019), argue that cultural issues are every bit as important as economic ones. Personally, however, I find it difficult to establish a hierarchy between these two dimensions. Rather than viewing them as competing factors, I would see them as deeply interconnected and mutually reinforcing.
What is certain is that, while the spirit of the age (Zeitgeist) and broader worldviews (Weltanschauungen) shape the dominant cognitive and political frameworks of a given era, material, economic, and social conditions are no less important. Consequently, the challenge for the left today may not be to determine which of these factors carries greater weight, but rather to strike an appropriate balance between them.
What seems clear to me is that the left cannot afford to lose sight of the renewed centrality of economic concerns - particularly those related to employment, equality, and social justice. These issues constitute the historical and normative foundations of the left’s political identity. Without a strong commitment to them, the left risks losing its distinctiveness and, ultimately, becoming unrecognisable.

Supply-side or demand-side economics: how is the left positioning itself in some European countries, and what are the terms of the debate? To what extent is the center-left positioning itself on issues of competitiveness or reindustrialization?

Left-wing parties have historically favoured demand-side policy instruments: redistribution, public investment, welfare provision, wage support, and measures aimed at strengthening domestic demand. However, the transformations of recent years - including the pandemic, competition with China and the United States, and the green and digital transitions - have brought issues such as productivity, competitiveness, and the centrality of industrial policy back to the forefront of political debate. The underlying idea is that the pursuit of social justice requires a strong productive base. In this sense, the reality is that financing welfare systems, the ecological transition, public services, and quality employment ultimately depends on sustained and robust economic growth.

On this front, the radical left continues to maintain a more critical stance, arguing that - even while advocating an alternative model of economic development based on a more sustainable and socially responsible industrial system - competitiveness cannot become an end in itself. From this perspective, investment in employment and the protection of workers’ rights, especially those most vulnerable to the uncertainties and inequalities of the current neoliberal era, must remain the overriding priority.

To put it succinctly, the real divide is not between Keynesianism and the market. The fundamental challenge is rather to devise a model capable of reconciling economic competitiveness with social protection, ensuring that efficiency and growth go hand in hand with equality, security, and social cohesion.

Spanish Prime minister, Pedro Sanchez, at the Congress, on June 24th 2026  
Copyright Oscar DEL POZO / AFP