A National Security Strategy for Trump 2: Continuation of Policy by Other Means

15/12/2025

Author

Resident Senior Fellow - Expert in Defense and National Security issues

Having a national security strategy - rather than a simple National Strategic Review - is undeniably an asset in itself, but under what conditions is that strategy efficient ? We continue our national security primer by examining President Trump’s national security strategy

The publication of the American National Security Strategy (NSS) has sparked many reactions, particularly in Europe, including perplexity, consternation, or sarcasm. Even if it may seem declaratory and messy, this 29-page document signed by Trump cannot be neglected. In American nomenclature, the National Security Strategy (NSS) sits at the apex of the doctrinal hierarchy: it defines the strategic posture that the various instruments of the state will implement, primarily through military means (the Trump administration is also preparing to publish its National Defense Strategy, the outlines of which Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has begun to sketch ).

Under these conditions, this NSS must undergo rigorous evaluation to assess its true scope and adapt accordingly.

A Disruptive Strategy

The NSS 2025 is a disruptive document, not so much because of its brevity - it is shorter than the average of previous NSSs, although Clinton’s 1994 and Obama’s 2015 NSSs were of similar length, and George H. W. Bush’s 1993 NSS was even shorter at 21 pages - but because of its substantive and formal content.
From this content, the key takeaways are :

1. Political Polarization of a Strategic Document

The NSS primarily targets the political adversaries of the current president, notably pursuing a vendetta against the Biden administration. Trump opens fire from the very first paragraph: "after four years of weakness, extremism, and deadly failures…". The document launches repeated attacks on previous administrations and the ‘elites’ ("our elites," "American foreign policy elites"), highlighting their errors: "American elites-over four successive administrations of both political parties-were either willing enablers of China’s strategy or in denial".

By taking up Trump’s campaign themes and embedding them in the domain of national security ("In everything we do, we are putting America First"), this NSS becomes a vehicle for a partisan struggle that is almost cultural in nature, conducted within the American political sphere. It thus transforms a strategic document into a political one in the strictest sense, altering both its scope and its effectiveness.

This NSS becomes a vehicle for a partisan struggle that is almost cultural in nature, conducted within the American political sphere. It thus transforms a strategic document into a political one in the strictest sense

Despite its brevity, the document lacks a clear logical structure. Rather than producing a cognitive effect through reasoning, it presents a succession of notions ("sovereignty," "fairness," "competence and merit," "realignment through peace," "civilizational self-confidence," etc.).

It is therefore less an organized chain of concepts than a free association of political feelings (this however does not make them any less powerful as motivators).

Beyond this ideologization of national security, a notable feature of this NSS is the extreme personalization of its endeavor. A president is generally not mentioned in the NSS he signs. Here, quite remarkably, Trump is mentioned 27 times in a 29-page document. It is painful to read, in an American document of this stature, this pointless and recurring flattery ("President Trump single-handedly reversed more than three decades of mistaken American assumptions about China," "President Trump has cemented his legacy as The President of Peace," "President Trump has leveraged his dealmaking ability to secure unprecedented peace in eight conflicts around the world," etc.) which undermines its credibility."

For this purpose as well, the NSS awkwardly attempts to place Trump’s actions in a flattering continuity by selecting certain key terms from American history. Alexander Hamilton (p. 13) and the Monroe Doctrine (p. 15) are cited directly. Indirect references are made to Reagan (via his campaign slogan "Peace through Strength," which formed the core of his foreign policy doctrine), Theodore Roosevelt (the first to add a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine), and John Foster Dulles (Eisenhower’s Secretary of State and father of the strategic concept of ‘rollback,’ which the NSS now applies-p. 18-to the Western Hemisphere).

2. A Radical Strategic Reprioritization

Thematically, immigration is elevated to the level of a national strategic priority ("Border security is the primary element of national security"), and the urgency is confronting an "invasion" that articulates all external dangers ("We must protect our country from invasion, not just from unchecked migration, but from cross-border threats such as terrorism, drugs, espionage, and human trafficking"). The reaffirmation of the priority of the Golden Dome ("We want the world’s most robust, credible, and modern nuclear deterrent, plus next-generation missile defenses-including a Golden Dome for the American homeland") reflects the same highly defensive perspective. The "survival" of the United States is even mentioned several times ("A border controlled (…) is fundamental to the survival of the United States"). Consequently, immigration becomes a criterion for alliances ("we want a world in which (…) sovereign countries work together to stop rather than facilitate destabilizing population flows, and have full control over whom they do and do not admit")."

The preeminence granted to economic security ("economic security is fundamental to national security") warrants particular attention. This is also the most structured and thematically complete section, with conceives economic security in an integrated manner across its different segments: commercial diplomacy, securing supply chains and critical materials including through intelligence action, reindustrialization ("cultivating American industrial strength must become the highest priority of national economic policy"), energy policy, financial support for innovation, and technological dominance in critical sectors.

These themes are not new: most of them were already present in Trump’s first NSS, but they were still counterbalanced by a more structured strategic vision (likely due to a more "traditional" national security team: National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, Dina Powell, Nadia Schadlow). In 2025, these stabilizing figures have disappeared, as if Trump had effectively emancipated himself from his own national security team.

Geographically, a new regional hierarchy places the Western Hemisphere first , before Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. By explicitly reactivating the Monroe Doctrine with a corollary ("The Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine") , the United States aims in this area to establish regional hegemony aimed at guaranteeing its security and national economic interests, and preventing interference by external competitors: "After years of neglect, the United States will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere (…). We will deny non-hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets in our Hemisphere". In response to these external competitors, the NSS explicitly endorses coercive measures against American countries: "we will (through various means) discourage their collaboration with others".

3. A Disruption in the Strategic Doctrine regarding China and Russia

By stating its new national priorities, the NSS formally abandons the notion of great power competition, the structuring paradigm in American strategic thinking over the past fifteen years (the concept nevertheless remained central in Trump's first NSS in 2017).

Russia is not even the subject of a dedicated chapter. It only appears on page 25, in the section dedicated to Europe.

Unlike the previous NSS (2022), Russia is not even the subject of a dedicated chapter. It only appears on page 25, in the section dedicated to Europe, and in the context of Europe’s difficulties in asserting itself in its relationship with Russia.

In a curiously neutral tone, while Trump's previous NSS characterized Russia as a "revisionist power" challenging American power ("China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity") , it is treated as a factor to be stabilized, and not as a factor of destabilization : "It is a core interest of the United States to negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, in order to stabilize European economies, prevent unintended escalation or expansion of the war, and reestablish strategic stability with Russia".

China is mainly considered an economic competitor, and the NSS formulates the overall objective of rebalancing the economic relationship ("we will rebalance America’s economic relationship with China"). The security aspect is more ambiguous. On the one hand, the NSS affirms the primacy of nation-states, respect for their sovereignty, and a stated reluctance to intervene in the sovereign affairs of other States, all elements that correspond to traditional Beijing rhetoric.

On the other hand, the active application of the Monroe Doctrine clearly targets the Chinese positions in the area that must be rolled back. In the Indo-Pacific, the NSS clearly states its desire to maintain the status quo around Taiwan, and to prevent the emergence of foreign control over the South China Sea and the first island chain ("We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain") , by providing the means for reinforced and credible conventional military deterrence, supported by regional allies.

Iran is briefly mentioned (the NSS mentions that Midnight Hammer has strongly degraded its capabilities, including its nuclear program) , while North Korea is absent from the NSS.

4. The Elevation of Politico-Moral Concepts-Such as "Cultural Health" and "Spiritual Health"-to Strategic Priorities

The appearance of culture (and even more so spirituality) in a strategic document of this nature is all the more surprising given that the emphasis is placed on their "health," thereby inviting subjective interpretation.

Cultural health nevertheless is framed as a strategic issue that must be supported ("[we must] bolster our society’s cultural health") and specifically protected against "cultural subversion," both external (propaganda and foreign influence operations) and internal (DEI and discriminatory practices in the United States).

While this use of culture undoubtedly arises from a conceptual confusion stemming from the notion of soft power (which the NSS lists among American assets: "Unmatched soft power and cultural influence"), health, spirituality, and family values are likely mentioned insofar as they are, in this vision, determinants of identity, and thus of sovereignty, and fundamentally of the power of a nation: "Finally we want the restoration and reinvigoration of American spiritual and cultural health" (p. 4).

5. The European Impasse

Europe, defined as strategically and culturally vital for the United States (the section dedicated to Europe is entitled "Promoting European Greatness"), nevertheless attracts the harshest criticism and the most pessimistic assessment. Beyond an economic decline measured as a share of global GDP, the NSS identifies the EU as the source of critical problems for the sovereignty of European countries, ultimately leading to the risk of "civilizational erasure."

The NSS identifies the EU as the source of critical problems for the sovereignty of European countries, ultimately leading to the risk of "civilizational erasure."

In the vision formulated by the NSS, the conditions for a dialogue of the deaf are thus met: the United States is attached to the transatlantic relationship (as much as European countries) but believes that the current European trajectory is detrimental to them (which is exactly what European countries think of the current American trajectory).

Trump’s America therefore wants, in its own interest, to help European countries reform themselves ("our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory") and details its axes for doing so (thereby contradicting its refusal of "cultural subversion").

The Limits: What is a National Security Strategy for?

The elaboration of an NSS is a pivotal act for an executive, which fulfills several capital functions: it fixes the strategic posture that the combined means of the State apparatus must implement, facilitates the cohesion of allies, and contributes to strategic signaling addressed to adversaries ; finally, by publishing its work, it anchors a public national security policy. If one adheres to these parameters, the efficiency of this NSS is doubtful.

The strategic elaboration process, which is in itself a generator of assets, has visibly been bypassed. Although an NSS is essentially a technical document intended to achieve political effectiveness, this one reverses the logic: it introduces a political approach into the strategic domain without attempting to address the approximations or difficulties that may subsequently arise.

Ultimately, the reallocation of military means - how a shift of forces towards the Americas would materialize - and investments (notably for the Golden Dome) will make it possible to quantify the real effectiveness of this NSS to be quantified.

For the time being, the obvious contradictions in this posture generate their own handicap. Thus, the NSS recognizes the need for allies, if only to counter Chinese economic power and to divide the cost of capability investments (in Europe as in Asia). But to build a coalition, one must not announce so bluntly the construction of a power struggle against one’s potential allies. By shamelessly hammering home the primacy of "America First," the NSS immediately devalues American soft power, which was traditionally based on a voluntary community of values, and on the hope of a benevolent sharing by a primus inter pares that, if not sympathetic, remained fundamentally attractive. This kind of cynicism, naive enough to self-profess, is not a matter of bold realpolitik, it is a diplomatic blunder.

This kind of cynicism, naive enough to self-profess, is not a matter of bold realpolitik, it is a diplomatic blunder.

The real question posed by reading this NSS is ultimately that of its duration. What is the future of a strategy whose justification is so arbitrary, and what is the inherent obsolescence of such a hyper-personalized strategy, especially one tied to a president who will become a lame duck in less than three years?

Copyright image: Andrew CABALLERO-REYNOLDS / AFP
Donald Trump and Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth at the White House on 2 December 2025.

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